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ABSTRACT
It has now been well established that forests in South Asia are
postcolonial political zones. In Assam, in northeast India this was
accomplished through the colonial project of converting jungles
into Reserved Forests. Using the politics of dokhol (“to grab or
occupy by force”) as an entry point, this article examines the
comparative epistemologies of squatting and informality in urban
and rural contexts. My intent is to unpack the everyday practice,
maintenance, and sustenance of dokhol within the reserved
forests of Bodo Territorial Autonomous District. This entails an
extension of existing scholarship on formal-informal dichotomies
in relation to rural squatters, in particular those on forestland. I do
so by combining an ethnographic study of dokhol by rural
squatters with three inﬂuential strands of critical scholarship on
urban squatting, namely Partha Chatterjee’s “political society,”
Asaf Bayat’s “quiet encroachment,” and Ananya Roy’s take on
planning and deregulation. This article advances the case of rural
informalities and opens a dialogue between the two forms of
informalities – rural and urban, especially in the context of South
Asia.
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Me: “Will you sell me some of your land, since you say you have over ﬁfteen
bighas1 of land?”
Jogeswar Lakra: “Why do you have to buy land from me? Look around, [pointing to vast
stretches of forestland] there is mela maati (an abundance of land). Go
and dokhol some!”
Introduction – why rural informality?
At the time of my ﬁeldwork, Jogeswar had been residing in the Lung Sung block under the
Haltugaon forest division within the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) of
Assam for over three decades. Being a proud encroacher of over ﬁfteen bighas of reserved
forestland,2 his response to my question, asked in jest, unlocked a Pandora’s box on every-
day forms and practices of informality in rural squatter settlements inside the reserved
forests of Assam.
© 2018 BCAS, Inc.
CONTACT Anwesha Dutta anwesha.dutta@ugent.be Department of Conﬂict and Development Studies, Ghent
University, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
1In Assam, 1 bigha= 1/3 acres (approximately).
2All forestland in Assam is state owned.
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Using the politics of dokhol as an entry point, in this article I interrogate the compara-
tive epistemologies of forms and trajectories of squatting and informality in urban and
rural contexts. Dokhol is a Bengali/Assamese word that translates as “to grab or
occupy,” usually illegally. In this context Jogeswar used it in relation to land. Like him,
the most common response among my interviewees as to how they came to possess
land was through dokhol.
The main focus on relational ties between squatting and informality has been predomi-
nantly urban. On the one hand, encroaching on public space and public order has been
more pronounced within urban settings. Due in part to the prevalence of police surveil-
lance, urban conﬂicts over encroachment are more visible and audible, and hence
attract more media and scholarly attention.3 Conversely, rural forms of squatting and
informality have received scarce attention. Tania Li has examined rural squatting in the
Dongi-Dongi valley inside Lore Lindu National Park in Sulawesi, Indonesia.4 In that
case, access to land and natural resources were guided by customary rights that are
locally acknowledged and respected, but not formally registered, and therefore “not recog-
nized by the various oﬃcial agencies responsible for allocating state’’ land.5 Similarly, Ann
Stoler has written about squatter settlements and subsequent resistance movements
around northern Sumatra’s plantation peripheries during the 1960s and 1970s.6 More
recently, Carl Griﬃn has provided a systematic historical account of squatting practices
in rural Britain within the post-Restoration New Forest, characterizing squatting as an
abuse to forest resources.7 This existing body of work on rural squatting in the milieu
of plantations or on the fringes of national parks has been framed in a context of resistance
rather than everyday forms of mediations and negotiations.8 There has been no systematic
attempt to understand everyday forms of life and informality in these rural settlements.
My intent is to unpack the everyday practice, maintenance, and sustenance of dokhol
within the reserved forests of BTAD, where dokhol operates as a form of gray legality.
This entails an extension and confrontation of the existing scholarship on formal-informal
dichotomies in relation to rural squatters, in particular those on forestland, mostly referred
to as encroachers rather than squatters.9
In South Asia the debate around informality has been framed through theorizations of
the urban poor who live in slums and wage their claims to space and resources from a dis-
advantaged position as “citizens without a city.”10 The literature on state engagement
practiced by the urban poor in several cities in South Asia has revealed a multitude of
methods, exploiting the pluralistic, multifaceted and ﬁssured state apparatus.11 Partha
Chatterjee (2004) illustrated these everyday forms of engagement by squatters with the
3Personal communication, with Asef Bayat, March 10, 2018.
4Li 2007, 167.
5Li 2007, 98.
6Stoler 1986.
7Griﬃn 2018.
8For an overview of work related to rural squatting in the context of resistance, see Li 2007; Griﬃn 2018; Hilson 2013; Cat-
taneo 2013.
9For a comprehensive discussion about issues of the urban poor living in slums, jhuggis, and squatter settlements, and
discourses on urban rehabilitation, re-settlement, and poverty alleviation in the Global South, see Ramanathan 2006;
Suykens 2015; Benjamin 2008; Isabaeva 2013; Björkman 2014; Hatcher 2015; Rao 2013.
10Appadurai 2001, 27.
11See Ranganathan 2014; Rao 2013, who uses the concept of “tolerated encroachment,” and Das 2011. Jha et al. 2007
discuss how local politicians serve as alternative democratic conduits for the urban poor to derive concessions from
the state. Appadurai 2001 and Kumar 2016 demonstrate how the urban poor challenge governmentality from below.
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state through his concept of political society. Other scholars have emphasized forms of
negotiation, claims to urban citizenship by the urban poor, and the concept of insurgent
citizenship.12 Roy (2004) has argued for a subaltern urbanism that not only explores the
slum or squatter settlement as a “terrain of habitation, livelihood, and politics,” but as well
as a key theoretical frame for rethinking the “epistemologies and methodologies of urban
studies.”13 Bert Suykens has engaged with everyday forms of negotiations through the
dokhol regime in the context of a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh, arguing “the notion of
dokhol ﬁrmly positions the use of informality by the (relatively) wealthy ( jomidar) in
the seemingly quintessential place of the poor, thus showing their interconnectedness.”14
To sum up, scholars of urban informality in South Asia have consistently examined the
various forms of popular agency developed by the urban poor and their forms of resistance
to state authorities.
In this article I shift away from this urban-centric approach and illustrate how squatting
plays out in a remote rural context characterized by conﬂict along ethno-religious lines,
violence-induced displacement, and natural disasters like ﬂoods. A better understanding
of rural forms of squatting not only contributes to the general body of work on squatting
and informality in South Asia and beyond but also shows how squatting and informality
play out in precarious rural environments. I combine an ethnographic study of the dokhol
regime of rural squatters in Assam with three inﬂuential strands of critical scholarship on
urban squatting: namely Partha Chatterjee’s “political society,”15 Asaf Bayat’s “quiet
encroachment,”16 and Ananya Roy’s focus on planning and deregulation.17
The abovementioned scholarship denotes how urban ontologies on informality tend to
span collective and individual demands for socio-economic recognition, representation,
and access to state welfare services and resources. Although similar categories exist
when it comes to rural informalities, an intimate relationship with maati (land) is a cen-
trifugal point of ontological departure. This relationship can be traced back to the colonial
history of forest making in the state.18
Urban squatter settlements are usually home to rural migrants, essentially poor people
with limited resources.19 As Janice Perlman (2004) writes in the context of favelas in
Brazil, they are perceived as “cancerous sores on the beautiful body of the city” and
dens of “anti-social activities, ﬁlth and various pathologies.”20 Such claims do not
always hold true for rural squatters, because while the slum appears as the “other” in
the eyes of city dwellers or civil society,21 rural squatters remain “others” mostly in the
eyes of state forest authorities. This form of alienation from aspects of urban living has
led to the emergence of a “right to the city,” a concept coined by Henri Lefebvre in the
12For a detailed overview on urban citizenship claims, see Zerah et al. 2011. For a discussion of “post-media” urbanism in
postcolonial India, see Sundaram 2010.
13Roy 2011, 224.
14See Suykens 2015.
15Chatterjee 2004.
16Bayat 2000, 2013. Although Bayat used the concept of quiet encroachment in the context of the Middle East and author-
itarian regimes, authors such as Hackenbroch 2013 and Subadevan and Naqvi 2017 have used it in the context of urban
slums in Dhaka in Bangladesh and Chennai in India.
17Roy 2004.
18Saikia 2008.
19Roy and Alsayyad 2004.
20Perlman 2004, 120.
21Chatterjee 2004, 38.
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context of university students protesting in the streets of Paris in May 1968.22 David
Harvey (2003) later linked this claim to Marxist theory and argued that excluded protes-
tors should go beyond their individual status and strive for collective rights to shape every
aspect of the city. In recent times, urban groups have seized upon the term as a slogan to
protest against political oppression, disenfranchisement, and unequal distribution of
urban services.23 More recently, there has been renewed attention within the urban squat-
ting literature on poor people’s movements, while ethnographers have focused on
“cramped spaces,”24 spaces within which subaltern classes resist and rebel against govern-
ment programs.25
However, the concept of rights to the city and everyday resistance are not fully appli-
cable in the context of this study. This is encroachment for survival, one day at a time.
Rather than a potential site of resistance against exclusion, it is a site of domination
and unequal relations of power. To me, the squatters I have engaged with are subjected
to even harsher forms of isolation – social, economic, and political – than their urban
counterparts.
Some have argued that urban squatters can derive inspiration by observing the life of
the city, while it continues to be hard for them to embrace that dream.26 As such, while
urban squatter settlements have often been considered to be at the margins of the
state,27 forest squatters’ lives are far more marginal. They barely have social or economic
networks outside of the forest, and in almost all cases they lack the social and economic
capital required to migrate to cities and become urban squatters. In such a context,
talking about a “right to the forest” is spurious.
Jungle becomes forest – the colonial project
The colonial project of transforming jungle into forest changed the face of Assam,
especially the northwest of the state, Bodoland. The drawing of new borders around an
unrestricted jungle to which everybody previously had access was part of a British
policy to make its colonies proﬁtable. In order to do this, natural resources such as sal
wood, rubber, and silk worms had to be clearly inventoried. This mapping of the jungle
began in 1826 and culminated with the creation of the Imperial Forest Department in
1868.28 By 1874, much of the jungle in this region had been transformed and divided
into a reserved forest, into which only Forest Department staﬀ and oﬃcials could enter.
Local political competitors such as zamindars (big landowners) and chiefs were granted
access to some forest resources. This policy helped keep these local elites in check and
created a dependency relationship. The main goal of the project was to keep the local
population out of the forest. Violence and political repression against encroaching fores-
ters and shifting cultivators ( jhummers) was thus inherent to border-making.29 The state
22Lefebvre 1996 [1967].
23LeGates and Stout 2015.
24Li 2007.
25Roy 2013.
26Perlman 2004.
27Das and Poole 2004.
28The treaty of Yandaboo was signed in 1826 between the Kingdom of Ava and Britain and led to the withdrawal of
Burmese forces from Assam. By 1842 the whole of Assam was under British rule.
29Saikia 2008; Van Schendel, Mey and Dewan 2000 write about the marginalization of indigenous jhummers in the Chit-
tagong Hill Tracts after it came under colonial rule in the 1860s.
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agency given jurisdiction over this territory, the Forest Department, claimed exclusive
rights to allocate and enforce use rights (for example, logging, grazing, or mining) while
setting conditions and refraining from allocating the right to lease, transfer, or sell the
land.
Although the British presence in Assam dates back to the Treaty of Yandaboo in
1826, it was only in the 1870s that the British sought to expand their grip on the
Assam economy and regulate the mobility of its indigenous population. This colonial
appropriation was sanctiﬁed by legislation in the years of British imperialism.30 Various
legal enactments led to a situation in which most forest areas were leased out to British
tea planters.31
These tea plantations required enhanced labor and this was supplied by immigrant
workers from across British India.32 Thousands of Adivasi peasants and Bengalis were
resettled in Assam as tea and jute plantation workers.33 This land grabbing by British
tea planters led to eventual upheaval and disturbances in the area, and the colonial gov-
ernment responded by introducing an inner line permit system in 1873.34 According to
Guha (1977), “Under this system, an imaginary line was drawn in the districts under
pressure in order to settle immigrants in segregated areas.”35 The net result of land settle-
ment in Assam shifted large expanses of land and forest resources from the control of the
peasantry to the colonial state. In recent years, this historic land issue has reemerged at the
heart of recurring ethno-political conﬂicts in the region, demonstrated by the practice of
dokhol.36
A theater of violent conﬂict on ethno-religious lines: forest becomes
frontline
The continuation of the colonial process of forest making in the post-colonial period is
particularly signiﬁcant in the case of Adivasis37 and their settlements inside the forestlands
of western Assam. These populations are former tea plantation laborers whose forefathers
migrated to Assam from central and eastern India at diﬀerent periods beginning in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Being non-scheduled tribes in Assam, they have no
forest use rights. Over time, these Adivasis (along with Bengali migrants) began to seek
land in distant forests. Agitated and threatened by their continued eﬀorts at grabbing for-
estland, indigenous Bodos clamored for state protection of tribal land, which led in 1947 to
the amendment of the Land and Revenue Regulation Act of 1886. The newly independent
government of India created tribal belt and block areas.38 This restricted the transfer of
30Saikia 2008.
31Guha 1993.
32Bhowmick 1981; Siddique 1990.
33In local popular imagination the forest remained part of the agrarian frontier, notwithstanding the changed landscape.
34Vandekerckhove 2009.
35Guha 1977.
36See Mishra1999, 2012, 2013; Barbora 2008; Baruah 1999, 2001; Vandekerckhove 2009.
37Adivasis in this case refers to groups who were brought from Bengal, Bihar, and the Chotanagpur plateau to work on tea
plantations. They were mainly of Oraon, Munda, and Santhals. In recent times there have been claims of Santhals immi-
grating to these areas from Jharkhand. While these groups have speciﬁc rights over forestland under the Forest Rights
Act, this does not extend to BTAD where they do not have scheduled tribe (ST) status.
38The tribal belts and blocks were established with the objective of protecting land from occupation by groups other than
protected classes such as plains and hills tribes, STs, and Nepali grazers. Later on, indigenous Koch-Rajbongshis of Goal-
para, Dhubri, Kokrajhar, and Bongaigaon districts were also added to this category.
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land to non-indigenous people in such protected areas. However, land in tribal reserves
continued to be sold to outsiders well into the 1980s. Not surprisingly the issue of protec-
tion of tribal land and forests was a prominent demand of the All Bodo Student Union’s
(ABSU) agitation for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland, which turned violent in
the later part of 1980s after the formation of insurgent groups. This illustrates how the
Bodo–Adivasi-Muslim conﬂict that followed “was about land and its delineation, as the
Bodo militants saw their natural, exclusive ethno-botanical link with their Bodo homeland
threatened by the non-autochthones” (Figure 1).39
It is therefore important to situate the emergence of dokhol practices within the recent
turbulent movement for a separate state of Bodoland, which in turn is intertwined with a
history of state-directed forest making and local insurgency. An armed insurgency began
in June 1996, led by the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) under the leadership of
Prem Singh Brahma. The resulting conﬂict took place in the forests bordering Bhutan
and Arunachal Pradesh, an area formerly known as Kachari (an older terminology for
the Bodo) Dooar, the traditional territory of the Bodo people.40 The Bodoland Movement
culminated in 2003 with a tripartite Memorandum of Settlement known as the second
Bodo Accord. This established the Bodo Territorial Council, delineated four Bodoland
Autonomous Territorial Districts, and dissolved the BLTF armed forces. Although this
accord ended the insurgency, incidents of violence erupted between Bodos and
Muslims and Bodos and Adivais in 2008, 2012, and 2014. As already mentioned, large
parts of this area had been transformed into reserved forests during the British colonial
period, subsequently making it oﬀ-limits for the indigenous people of the region. Initially
it was mostly due to the scarcity of cultivable land that led both Bodos and Adivasis to
encroach on the forest areas. However, interviews with local non-government organiz-
ation’s (NGO) staﬀ, forest oﬃcers and members of the ABSU indicate that a sizeable
number of Bodos settled in these reserved forests during the Bodoland movement in
the early 1990s in order to match the already settled Adivasi population. This was possible
because the forest areas during the conﬂict were mostly controlled by insurgent groups like
the Bodo Liberation Tigers and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. Moreover,
the reserved forests have also served as a place for temporary rehabilitation of victims
of ethnic violence.
The reserved forests in the Bodo region thus have emerged as a gray zone of informal
economies and practices. This is because the continued state attempt to control forests has
not eliminated illegality or informality, but rather, as I shall empirically show, at many
levels it has stimulated it.
Comparative epistemologies: urban–rural
Partha Chatterjee has emphasized the notion of “para-legality” in discussing urban
informalities in the context of a railway colony in the city of Kolkata.41 Lacking full citizen-
ship, the vast majority of India’s urban population is left to make claims on the state from
the murky ﬁeld of political brokerage, which he calls the “political society,” where the
39Vandekerckhove 2009.
40The data for this paper was collected primarily in reserved forests bordering Bhutan and therefore the focus will be on
that speciﬁc borderland.
41Chatterjee 2004.
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needs of this excluded populace are voiced and occasionally met, but always as con-
ditional claims rather than formal rights.42 The political society makes claims to state
services by forming associations and by “making a large array of connections outside
the group – with other groups in similar situations, more privileged and inﬂuential
groups, government functionaries, political parties and leaders.”43 This political society
is not segregated along caste, religious, or ethnic lines, especially when it comes to lob-
bying for rights and services. As one of his interviewees explained, “We are all a single
family. We don’t distinguish between refugees from East Bengal and those from villages
in West Bengal.”44
My observations on rural forms of squatting and informalities digress from this form of
political society on several points. The political society approach over-emphasizes collec-
tive action through associations, especially in the case of communities that do not live in
urban cityscapes with direct access to politicians and state oﬃcers. Moreover, the BTAD is
a militarized society; unlike urban centers like Delhi, Kolkata, or Mumbai. Additionally,
the squatter settlements in these districts are ethnically segregated, since the very nature
of conﬂict in the region has been on ethnic lines. Also, urban slums are made up of
rural migrants who have relocated to the semi-urban periphery of cities. However, in
Figure 1. Squatter settlement burnt during Bodo-Adivasi conﬂict in December 2014, Ultapaani
Reserved Forest, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
42Chatterjee 2004.
43Chatterjee 2004, 40–41.
44Chatterjee 2004, 56.
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this case my interviewees were those who have neither the resources nor the networks to
migrate from rural areas and thus are relegated to the peripheries of rural areas, such as
forests. When asked about the trajectory of mobility, more recent settlers in these districts
responded, “Our houses have been burned during the conﬂict and we are too scared to go
back. We do not have the means to migrate to Guwahati [the largest city in Assam] like
some of our neighbors back in the village.” They always added, “We wish for our own
piece of land” (amak nizor maati laage).
Ananya Roy in her work on urban informality asserts that emerging patterns of infor-
mal urban development in many regions of the world occur on private rather than public
plots of land, involving new and shifting conﬁguration of actors like real-estate develo-
pers, liberalizing government oﬃcers, and bourgeois urbanities.45 She describes inform-
ality as a mode of metropolitan urbanization and argues that South Asian research on
this topic can make a signiﬁcant contribution to the understanding of such processes.46
With its strident focus on the agrarian question, the spatiality of rural urban nexuses,
and the implications of neoliberal reforms for stage power, this research can address
questions about how the rural–urban interface is determined by urban and agrarian
laws and regulations, and how these are restructured in the context of liberalization.
Along with the political society literature, this approach assumes that South Asian and
particularly Indian urban informalities operate within a vibrant democracy free from
ethnic and religious violence. However, rural informality within the BTAD is more
akin to the spatial realties of Lebanon during its civil war (1975–1990), with ethnic poli-
tics playing a crucial role, or the ongoing Israel-Palestine conﬂict, where informal land
rights of settlers have been intensely ethnicized. Moreover Roy’s focus has mostly
been on semi-urban peripheries, while my focus is on the peripheries of the rural.
The increasing (dis)associations between the state and encroachers unpack the spatial
and legal categorization of the forest settlements as informal, given that the ontological
division between the formal and the informal and the hegemonic connection of the state
to legality appear to be increasingly devious.47
In regard to resistance, empirical evidence suggests that instead of resisting the state,
forest squatters deliberately attempt to remain invisible from the gaze of the state,
baring certain events like evictions or elections, when the state comes to them. Typically,
they make do with whatever limited resources and services they have access to, rather than
protest for missing services. Forms of rural informality in BTAD mirror the squatting,
street trading, and illegal tapping of utilities in urban Iran observed by Bayat.48 These pro-
cesses of appropriation have been enacted “quietly, individually, and gradually” rather
than through organized social movements or associations, and are justiﬁed as acts of
necessity in a context where the state has failed to provide employment or housing. Of
course, in Assam’s reserved forests there are no electricity, water, or gas services to illegally
tap into, nor health-care or education facilities. Forest squatters silently squat on their
most valued possession, land, in the face of violent conﬂict and forms of insecure land
tenure (Figure 2).
45Rajagopal 2008.
46Roy 2009.
47Cf. Rajagopal 2008.
48Bayat 2000.
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Ethnographic inquiry into the site and the notion of dokhol
I conducted over ten months of ethnographic ﬁeldwork in three phases. The ﬁrst phase
was carried out from April to June 2014, after an episode of ethnic violence between
Bodos and Muslims in April 2014, followed by the national elections in May 2014. The
second phase lasted from February to May 2015, shortly after ethnic clashes between
Figure 2. A young girl inside her home in the forest. Lungsung, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
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Bodos and Adivasis in December 2014 and during BTAD council elections in April 2015.
The ﬁnal phase took place from February until May 2016, during which time the Assam
Assembly elections were held. During my ﬁeldwork I focused on ﬁve factors that reinforce
the dokhol regime and illustrate gray legalities. These factors are: ethnic violence, periodic
elections, episodic evictions, construction of semi-permanent structures, and counter-
insurgency operations. Although similar processes can be found in urban settlements,
the geographical, socio-political, and economical context of these rural settlements dis-
tinguish them from urban peripheries.
I situate these factors within a system of institutional decentralization, where the forest
department falls under the local BTAD administration. During the armed conﬂict,
counter-insurgency operations within the forest were conducted by Assam state police
and the central government’s national army. However, resettlement policies in the post-
conﬂict period are the joint responsibility of the state, the central government, and the
BTAD. These factors shed light on how the space of gray legality in a rural and forest
space is comprised of a complex web of relations, recognitions, and concessions that trans-
cends formal property rights within a system of unauthorized land grabbing leading to
insecure tenure and access to forest resources. It is thus similar to Chatterjee’s railway
colony and Roy’s processes of deregulation.
Before detailing each of these ﬁve factors, I will provide context by scribing one of my
visits to Sorolpara, a remote village in the Haltugaon forest division in Kokrajhar district
on the Indian-Bhutan border. I was accompanied by a forest ranger and his team of forest
guards, which enabled me to observe interactions between authorities and encroachers.
Our walk through the destroyed vestige of the forest49 showed me how space had been
appropriated in what was supposed to be a protected forest, with tiny make-shift
bamboo hovels and plots of land in front used for cultivating chilies and mustard
(Figure 3).
As we ventured deeper, we came across a cowshed. The forest ranger said it had been a
green patch with several tall trees the last time he had been there, some three months
before. He was infuriated:
We already give them so much leeway, the last time I visited I asked them to stay on already
deforested areas of land and not cut more trees by sticking to marshy land on the river bank.
The District Forest Oﬃcer (DFO) had drawn an imaginary boundary six months back and
had requested them to not cross that, but these greedy people have crossed this line as well. I
will not do anything but report to the police and let the police deal with it… . most of these
encroachers are new settlers and have come from nearby villages or even Jharkhand.50
The practice of claiming, clearing and eventually allocating pieces of land in the forests was
usually executed through brokers or diwanis51 who were in most cases Adivasi or Bordo
headmen of an existing village within the reserved forests. The diwani clears a big patch of
land, builds a thatch and bamboo house, and proclaims he is the headman. He then invites
49There has been a rapid erosion of what actually constitutes forestland in the region. During the Bodoland insurgency,
rebels used timber sales to fund their cause, state administrators cleared the forest for counter-insurgency operations,
and Bodo and adivasi communities cut down trees to build houses and clear farm land. In recent times, rampant
timber smuggling has also been a cause of deforestation. Therefore, the landscape is one of vast stretches of cleared
land with mostly non-precious trees strewn around and bamboo huts.
50Jharkhand is a state in Eastern India. The Santhals are an adivasi ethnic group native to this state.
51This describes a person who yields power especially through close relationships with local politicians and administrators.
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people in his social and ethnic network that live in nearby villages or who have been dis-
placed due to conﬂict or natural disasters to come and settle on a piece of land, usually
measuring twelve bighas, in return for a small fee.52 Over time families settle and the
cleared land is transformed into a small hamlet with as many as ﬁfteen households. In
my interviews with settlers, residents were unanimously aware they were encroaching
on state property, since each time I asked how they came in possession of land, the
typical answer was “ami dokhol korisu” (we have encroached) or “etu dokhol maati”
(this is occupied land). They would tell me they had purchased the land from a certain
forest ofﬁcial and in consultation with the dewai they had the right to rent, sell, or transfer
their landholdings within their ethnic group with the approval of the rajya.53 When I
would ask if they had directly paid the forest ofﬁcial, the usual response was, “No …
we paid the diwani and he assured us that he would pay the ofﬁcial on our behalf.”
This indicates the reluctance of squatters to engage directly with the forest authorities.
When I posed this question to the forest ranger, he was completely unaware of any such
transactions and said that land clearing was an illegal racket run by the diwanis in conni-
vance with and backing of local politicians. It was evident that the fuzzy boundaries drawn
by forest oﬃcials were frequently transgressed, often with the knowledge of these oﬃcers.
Figure 3. A squatter settlement deep inside the forest in Sorolpara, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
52In Assam, one bigha= 1/3 acre (approximately).
53A rajya is something like a panchayat but in this case informally selected by elderly men with economic resources and
political connections. Matters of land allocation, allocation of votes, and settling of disputes are generally managed and
decided by them.
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In an interview, the District Forest Oﬃcer (DFO) explained how evictions were mostly
symbolic:
GIS imagery from 1976 reveals no trace of settlements in Lungsung and Sorolpara, indicating
this is a recent phenomenon. When it comes to eviction, we carry it out peacefully and give
the encroachers prior notice so that they have time to gather their belongings. Given the
limited ﬁnancial budget of the forest department, eviction drives have become a rarity and
mostly symbolic. After all, these are poor people and they also need a place to live. We
usually encourage them to erect temporary bamboo structures so that the damage during
evictions is minimal and they can move back to their homes within a day. Evictions are
mostly a way to contain the expansion of settlements rather than permanent displacement
or ousting of the population (Figure 4).
There are no resettlement or rehabilitation policies for forest squatters, who forest ofﬁcers
refer to as jongli or “wild.”Moreover, given the remoteness of these settlements, the lack of
resources in these areas, and the risks of insurgency, it is extremely difﬁcult even for the
forest department to have adequate data on the actual number of households illegally
occupying state forestland. Secondly, the production of informality in this context chal-
lenges the notion that state institutions enact laws in an unambiguous manner. Rather,
in this ambiguous space of gray legality and insecure tenure, a symbiotic and symbolic
relationship prevails between (formal) state and informal (local) practices.54 The encroa-
chers comply with periodic evictions as long as they are given prior notiﬁcation and have
Figure 4. Home of a forest squatter from outside, in Lungsung, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
54See Cooper 1998.
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time to gather their valuables, if any, since their most valued possession is the land. Recent
squatters have transgressed boundaries in two ways – by being invisible, usually venturing
deep inside the reserved forest to areas not frequented by forest ofﬁcers, and by expanding
existing settlements rather than establishing new villages, making it difﬁcult for the forest
ofﬁcers to identify new settlements.55
Similar to their counterparts who spend years squatting in urban areas, transgression
and improvisation become the condition of living for forest encroachers without necess-
arily resulting in forms of collective action. The collective life of those living on the
fringes is one of jugaad, the creative and opportunistic piecing together of arrangements,
exempliﬁed by the practice of squatting or encroaching.56 This symbiotic relationship
between law as manifested through the state apparatus and legal acts and forest as a pol-
itical space of everyday contestation and negotiations have been continuing since colo-
nial times.57
Additional issues concerning security and counter-insurgency operations seep into the
everyday practices of encroachment, which makes the geography of rural squatting unique
as compared to an urban city. This comes with constant vigilance and patrolling by the
armed forces as well as their impunity to kill under the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act. The consistent lack of clarity in respect to state laws related to informality and the
drawing of fuzzy boundaries within the reserved forests enables ﬂexible accommodation,
but also gives unchecked eviction rights to state oﬃcers.58 Boundaries within forests are
ambiguously assigned and in a constant state of ﬂux depending on relationships
between encroachers and oﬃcers. Therefore, the dokhol regime comprises “fuzzy zones
of compromise, hide and seek, accumulation and accommodation” that “become the
rule rather than exception.”59
Next, I turn to the ﬁve factors that aid in the practice of dokhol over time. These are not
to be viewed in isolation but overlap and ﬂow from and into the other. These factors help
unpack comparative epistemologies of mutually exclusive contexts of informality and
marginalization that have great potential in interrogating meanings of gray zones by incor-
porating accounts of rural informality.
Recurring violence on ethnic lines
BTAD has been the site of recurrent violent contestations along ethno-religious lines. This
frequently results in large-scale displacement. Initial rehabilitation eﬀorts by the state
usually consist of setting up makeshift relief camps within the reserved forest. Once tem-
porarily settled, displaced people often refuse to return to their original homes, either out
of personal fear, worries that their homes have been destroyed, or concerns that they will
not receive a resettlement grant to construct a new house. There are also cases in which the
displaced do not have title to land and temporary resettlement is a means of engaging in
dokhol. As one of the DFOs explained:
55Interview with forest ranger on September 15, 2016.
56See Gotz and Simone 2003; Simone 2001.
57Sivaramakrishnan 1995.
58Hall, Hirsh, and Li 2011, 12.
59Hall, Hirsh, and Li 2011, 16.
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The administration (referring to the district and state governments) always sets up relief
camps inside the forests since it is considered a safer haven in times of turmoil and the popu-
lation can be segregated on ethnic lines and placed in diﬀerent camps under the protection of
the para-military forces. Since the army and para-military outposts are already set up inside
the forest for counter-insurgency purposes, it makes sense to place the displaced population
close to these already established units. However, once a relief camp is set up for 100 people,
more than 200 arrive, even those not aﬀected by conﬂict but looking to grab land. I would
blame this entire business of illegal encroachment on administrative failure.
According to DFOs, forest rangers, and NGO workers I interviewed, on average about
twenty to thirty percent of people displaced after each incident of violence refuse to
move back to their homes after the violence ends. This is illustrated by one of my inter-
locutors, whose in-laws have been living in Lung Sung since conﬂict began there in 1998:
My in-laws ﬁrst lived around char60 land and were displaced due to soil erosion. After living
in a relief camp for a couple of months they returned to their old home and were displaced for
a second time due to the building of a dam. They were rehabilitated in a nearby village but
were displaced for a third time in 1998 due to ethnic violence. Then they contacted relatives
in Lung Sung and moved there. Now they have over ﬁfteen bighas of dokhol land and they
refuse to move anywhere else. They will not leave their land (Figure 5).
This account illustrates the role played by personal aspiration in rural–urban migration.
Appadurai (2007) characterizes aspiration as a speciﬁcally cultural capacity, thus
moving culture away from an association with “pastness.”61 However, this does not
exclude the fact that a majority of rural–urban migration happens in search of better econ-
omic prospects.62 Forest squatters are an example of the vulnerabilities experienced by
landless and displaced people who have no means of commuting to a city and hence
ﬁnd themselves on the peripheries of remote villages. As one of my interviewees
recounted, “We will never get so much land anywhere. We shall give our blood but not
part with our land.” Once settled in the forest, encroachers make sure to not construct
any permanent or solid structures and seek to remain invisible. Maneuvering between
having legal land rights (patta) and squatting emerges as a process of ambiguity subject
to resourceful manipulation.
Periodic elections
Along with elections to the national parliament and the state assembly, residents of the
BTAD also elect a territorial council. The elections are an important democratic event
in which the forests become spaces for political campaigns that in turn enable encroachers
to leverage the advantages of scale to advance their land claims. Political parties come to
the forest instead of squatters going into towns to attend political rallies. Like their urban
counterparts, diwanis are conscious of being valued as votes and use this position to nego-
tiate with the political parties and the local administration for wells, roads, and even land
rights. These practices are particularly important for encroachers’ ability to engage with
the state. By articulating these eﬀorts the state is in many ways compelled to expand
the circuit of knowledge accessible to these communities. But the engagement happens
60A track of land surrounded by river or sea.
61Appadurai 2004, 31.
62Shaw 2008, 21.
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at an individual level and has not resulted in collective forms of resistance.63 Therefore
voting is a necessity rather than an exercise of choice. As Malati, who had been dwelling
with her family on forestland in Lungsung for two decades, explained in an interview,
“Elections will come and go. We vote because they ask us to vote and say if we don’t
vote we will be evicted. We just want to live peacefully inside the forest.”
This gradual involvement of the state and with the state over time unpacks and shifts
the meaning of informality and reaﬃrms the point that these are not reiﬁed end products.
To illustrate the above, in one of my visits to Lungsung just before the 2016 Assam Assem-
bly elections, a forest ranger explained:
We [the forest department] repeatedly warn the encroachers to not cross the boundaries and
clear more trees to construct houses, but what can we do when the politicians assure them of
granting land rights? Only last week a senior member of the legislative assembly who has
been in power for over a decade distributed cartons consisting of an assortment of tarpaulin
sheets, utensils like pans and pots, a bucket, mug, mosquito net, and some ﬁrewood. This is
gear necessary to sustain in these forests. I have even heard that they have granted permission
to an NGO for the construction of a school on forestland. So, how are we supposed to do
anything when the politicians are encouraging them to nest illegally? Because of them (poli-
ticians) we become the bad guys.
Figure 5. A post-conﬂict relief camp inside the reserved forest in Haltugaon Forest Division, Kokrajhar
District. Credit: Author.
63This resonates with squatters in Tehran who steal urban services not to express their deﬁance vis-a-vis the authorities, but
out of necessity. See Bayat 1997.
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The relationship between vote seekers and the electorate is not limited to the event of
elections but often leads to formation of larger patronage networks which are of course
unequal in nature, and in which some encroachers manage to stay while others are
forced to exit the reserved forest. According to Chatterjee (2004) urban slum dwellers “
… profess a readiness to move out if they are given suitable alternative sites for resettle-
ment …”64 But this does not hold true for these forest squatters. Eviction usually
results not in them leaving the reserved forest but going deeper into it. The process of pol-
itical accommodation was explained to me by an oﬃcer of the Indian Police Services who,
being concerned with continuing encroachment, had approached the Minister of Forest
for the BTAD. He related to me the conversation that transpired between them:
I told the Minister about a recent trip to Sorolpara where I noticed new encroachers in a par-
ticular area. The minister said to me, if you would like to evict them, you have to do it now
when they are less in number. Once the number of households goes over forty, we will not be
in a position to issue political clearance, as it will aﬀect our chances in the next election.
This reﬂects the close relationship between legality and political practice on the ground,
where those in positions of power maneuver through constitutional deﬁnitions of illegality
to further their political interests and promote illegal accommodation based on insecure
tenure. This fragility and partiality of the state and its involvement with law making is
an “aspect of more complex power relations.”65 The lives and homes of the squatters con-
tinue to hang by the thread of electoral politics, and they remain subject to eviction at any
time, according to the whims of either the ruling party (once they have won the elections)
or the forest department, on grounds of afforestation and conservation.
Episodic evictions
Interviews with forest oﬃcers, senior state police oﬃcers, and local politicians pointed
toward one solution to the problem of encroachment: eviction. When I asked where
these marginalized people were supposed to go after eviction, no one had clear answers.
A DFO said, “We could get a few bighas and settle them on grazing lands by the
highway,” while another forest oﬃcer said, “They have come from Jharkhand and they
should be sent back.” Indeed, the threat of eviction (not always staged) is a constant
factor in the lives of encroachers. Satya Murmu, who had been encroaching on over thir-
teen bighas (approximately ﬁve acres) in Lungsung recounted:
We have almost gotten used to eviction since the forest ranger usually informs us in advance
and ask us to temporarily vacate our shacks. They also advise us to not build solid structures
to minimize the damage of eviction. There have been incidents where we have clashed with
the forest department by pelting stones and standing guard in front of our homes when they
came to evict us without prior notice, but eventually we return. Almost all of us have over ten
bighas of land and no matter where they resettle us, if at all, we will never have so much land.
The forest department does not really trouble us much.
The above assertion has to be situated in a context in which forest ofﬁcers, especially the
guards who live in close proximity to communities, are of the same ethnicity as the squat-
ters. Over time the forest department has reverted to a politics of negotiation and only
64Chatterjee 2004, 40.
65Mitchell 1991, 77.
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selective contestation in response to dokhol. Protecting the forest while trying to uphold
the welfare of the encroachers within highly rigid and outdated forest laws and regulations
brings to the fore the contradictions associated with laws and strategies that are inconsist-
ent. The encroachers as well as the forest department engage in a policy of mediation
wherein they navigate between rebel disturbances, rigid forest laws, and an inﬂux of
encroachers seeking a means of livelihood.
I would like to explain this phenomenon through an event of eviction that happened in
1998 and assumed monumental importance due to its magnitude and over all implication.
I have collected two versions of this particular incident, one from the DFO in change and the
other from encroachers who were directly aﬀected by it. According to one encroacher:
The forest department did not give us any prior notice, there were some rumors that an evic-
tion drive would be carried out, but we were not speciﬁcally informed and hence were not
prepared. The forest department along with the army not only demolished our houses but
also set them on ﬁre. When we tried to resist, some of us were brutally beaten up. In fact,
an infant who was inside one of the houses lost his life to the ﬁre.
The DFO’s rejoinder was the following:
It was a peaceful drive in which we demolished over ﬁfty houses and requested the encroa-
chers to either go back to their native villages. In in case they did not have access to any land
rights, we promised to resettle them on grazing land across the highway from Karigaon. We
carried out this operation with the help of para-military forces. As far as we are concerned, no
lives were lost in the process but the cunning encroachers burned a cat and used the corpse of
the cat to accuse us of murdering an infant in the process. These are just blatant lies and I can
assure you that it was the corpse of a cat.
Eventually this case was taken to the Assam High Court, which acquitted the DFO and
dismissed allegations against the forest department but ruled that henceforth every evic-
tion drive had to be accompanied by planned processes of resettlement and rehabilitation.
Since then there have been fewer evictions (Figure 6).
Construction of (semi) permanent structures
Under Indian law it is illegal to erect any structure inside a reserved forest. Although the
encroachers I interviewed were aware that they were encroaching on land claimed by the
government, they did not believe their illegal settlements were diﬀerent from legal villages
where people held land titles and had access to state services such as health clinics, schools,
and well water. This view arose from the belief that the state had a responsibility to protect
its citizens, something which was repeatedly promised by candidates during elections.
Forms of mediation and negotiations over time can lead, in rare cases, to the erection
of permanent structures. I witnessed one such case within a reserved forest space that
housed a concrete building, mainly used as a school. A local adivasi leader who was
also a senior teacher at this school explained:
We have been residing here post the conﬂict of 1998 and have not yet received compensation
from the government. Our houses were burned down during the conﬂict and we are still
scared to go back since our village is very close to Bodo villages. So, we decided to construct
make shift houses in the same space which once used to be the relief camp but we still have no
running water or electricity. For this school, we had to pressure the education department.
The Don Bosco foundation ﬁrst built this school with bamboo and thatch, as an educational
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project to instruct children in the relief camp up to primary level and gradually the ground-
work for a concrete structure was put in place. It ﬁnally took over eight years for this school to
come up and now we teach up to tenth grade here.
When I asked the DFO about this, he gave me a sly look and almost whispered:
Did you have a careful look at the foundation stone just outside the school building? It was
laid and inaugurated by the BTAD’s Minister of Forestry and Tourism. I should also mention
that during elections, this school is turned into a polling booth for all the squatters residing
even in nearby areas.
Erection of permanent structures with the consent of political parties in what is ofﬁcially
reserved forest land such as this school building serves a two-fold purpose. On the one
hand it increases the bargaining capacity of encroachers by rendering some permanence
to the system of dokhol and on the other it helps politicians gain electoral support. There-
fore state law appears to be increasingly fragmented and internally pluralized.66
Counter-insurgency operations
The reserved forest is at the core of the state’s counter-insurgency operations. In the last
two decades, the armed movement for the creation of Bodoland has forced the forest
department out of the interior parts of the reserved forests after several incidents in
Figure 6. Possessions of a squatter family in Saralpara, Kokrajhar District. Credit: Author.
66De Sousa Santos 2002.
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which rebels burnt down forest check-posts. In one incident in December 2014, the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit faction launched an attack on a squatter
settlement, establishing their presence in the inner parts of the forest. The military has
responded to these incidents by felling tall trees so as to seek out rebel hideouts. Eventually
these cleared plots of land become new spaces for encroachers. In one informal village I
visited, the headman said:
Look at the clear patches of land around, it used be forest; it is the work of the Indian Army.
We heard that rebels were hiding in these forests and one day the army came and cut down
all the trees. Now people have built houses there.
Limited control over the remaining untouched forest by the forest department due to fear
of insurgents has also opened up space for encroachers. Most of the forest ofﬁces have
been relocated to army and para-military camps, further distancing the forest department
from everyday forest life.67 These remaining forests are both the center of military oper-
ations and conservation. The squatters ﬁnd themselves stuck in between these processes,
fearing attacks by insurgents and eviction by the state.
Conclusion
In this article I have compared and contrasted how informality plays out in a rural context by
identifying ﬁve ethnographic factors which illustrate squatters’ unconditional attachment to
land and the practices which allow them to hold this land. This intersection between formal
governance and informal encroachment in a forest setting illustrates dokhol as a tactic. This
also reﬂects the vulnerabilities and power relations that comewith living on the fringes of the
state. The rural squatters in this study are not only extremely poor and vulnerable; they have
also been kept out of academic discourses and policy domains.
These rural squatters prefer to remain invisible from the gaze of the state and practice
dokhol, but not as a form of collective action. A key reason attributed to dokhol by a forest
ranger was, “These are all new people who have taken an opportunity during the conﬂict
and settled here.” Conﬂict opened up junctures to retain this attachment to land. I have
also highlighted how, unlike their urban counterparts who negotiate and resist the state
in order to gain access to housing, water, education, and health services, these forest
encroachers ask for little from the state. They usually use less than one bigha of their
total land to build a make shift house, often trampled upon by wild elephants. What
motivates them to live deep in the forest is the idea of possessing ﬁfteen bighas of land.
Land for them is not scarce in quantity; what is scarce is legal land. It is this legal scarcity
that entrenches the squatters in unequal power relations with state authorities. Factors like
counter-insurgency operations and the presence of insurgents allow them to hold onto
their small pieces of land, while remaining invisible.
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